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The New Global Human Community
Rafael Domingo*

Abstract
Under the impact of global.ation, the international community is in the process of
evolving into a new community made up of new members, inspired by new principles, and based
on new ideas. The first part of this Article aims to justify the existence of this emerging
community usingfour arguments that can be summariZed by the Latin terms dignitas, usus,
necessitas, and bonum commune. The second part argues that the new global human
community hasfourfeatures: that it comprisespersons, not nation-states; that it is universal in
nature; that membershp in it is compulsory; and that it is incomplete but complementary to
otherforms of community. These features of the new global human community will determine
both the structure of its legal system and its legal authority.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For centuries, the ideal of a universal human community living in perpetual
peace and happiness was a dream of many philosophers, jurists, and poets. The
Stoic cosmopolitan vision,' the Roman aspiration toward an empire without end
(imperium sine die),2 the Christian ideal of a world united by charity,3 the Dantian
longing for a universal monarchy,' and the Kantian project of world peace,'
among other ideas, have contributed over time to the growing sense that all
human beings are members of a single universal community.
Ever since the discovery of the New World at the end of the fifteenth
century, jurists and theologians alike, most notably members of the School of
Salamanca,' have been interested in the legal and moral implications of the
1

2

See Seneca, On Benefits (De benefdis), in Seneca, 3 Moral Essays § 7.1.7 (Harvard 1935) (John W.
Basore, trans) (". . . si sociale animal et in commune genitus mundum ut unam omnium domum
spectat. . . ." As translated by John W. Basore: ". . that, social creature that it is and born for the
common good, views the world as the universal home of mankind...."); Seneca, On Benefits 5
7.19.8, ("Quidquid erat, quo mihi cohaereret, intercisa iuris humani societas abscidit." As
translated by John W. Basore to: "For whatever the tie that bound him to me, it has been severed
by his breach of the common bond of humanity.").
See Virgil, Aeneid, Book I, 11278-79, in Virgil, Eclogues, Geogics, Aeneid 1-6 (Harvard 3d ed 1999)
(H. Rushton Fairclough, trans) ("[H]is ego nec metas rerum nec tempora pono; / imperium sine
fine dedi." As translated by H. Rushton Fairclough: "For these I set no bounds in space or time;
but have given empire without end.").

3

See Tertullian, Apologv § 38.3 (Harvard 6th ed 1984) (T.R. Glover, trans) ("Unam omnium
rempublicam agnoscimus mundum." As translated by T.R. Grover: "We acknowledge one allembracing commonwealth: the world.").

4

See Dante Alighieri, 1 Monarchia § 15.10 (Arnoldo Mondadori Editore 2004) (Nicoletta Marcelli,
trans) ("Quod si omnes consequentie superiores vere sunt, quod sunt, necesse est ad optime se
habere humanum genus esse in mundo Monarcham, et per consequens Monarchiam ad bene esse
mundi." As translated by Nicoletta Marcelli: "If all the above conclusions are true, as they are, for
mankind to be in its best state there must be a monarch in the world, and consequently the wellbeing of the world requires a monarchy.").

5

See generally Immanuel Kant, PerpetualPeace: A PhilosophicalSketch, in Hans Reiss, ed, Kant: Poiical
Wriings 93 (Cambridge 2d enlarged ed 1991) (H.B. Nisbet, trans).
See, for example, Francisco de Vitoria, On Chil Power, in Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance,
eds, Frandscode Vitoria: Poliical Writings 40 § 21 (Cambridge 1991); Francisco Suarez, De legibus, ac
Deo legslatore, in 2 Selections fvm Three Works of Frandsco Sudreg 349 § 191 (Clarendon 1944)
(Gwladys L. Williams, Ammi Brown, and John Waldron, trans).

6
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potential development of such a global commonwealth. The collapse of
international society after the tragic elimination of nearly sixty million people
during the Second World War revealed the weaknesses of the international legal
system born at Westphalia in 1648 and confirmed at Utrecht in 1713. The
Westphalian international order was based on both the concept of the sovereign
nation-state as the only recognized subject of international law and on the idea
of war as a legal remedy to resolve conflicts between and among states once
diplomatic efforts had been exhausted. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, in 1948, was a turning point from Westphalian thought and gave
prominence to the goal of establishing a community forged not only by national
self-interest but in a "spirit of brotherhood."'
By the end of the twentieth century, with the rapid rise in worldwide
interdependence and the corresponding increase in mutual vulnerabilitypopularly referred to as "globalization"-old utopian ideals of human unity and
perpetual peace had become political imperatives. In today's globalized world,
no existing political community, whether local, national, or supranational, can be
considered fully self-sufficient or guarantee complete global justice. And without
justice, there can be no peace,8 liberty, or happiness.' These local, national, and
supranational communities, being insufficient to provide global or international
justice, therefore must be complemented by an international political community
sufficient to provide global justice.
The common contemporary goal of addressing globally the problems
afflicting humanity is not just a moral option, but a moral and political duty with
important legal implications.'0 Global issues such as international terrorism,
arms trafficking, wars, hunger and poverty, political and economic corruption,
and environmental challenges cannot be adequately addressed by lone national
governments or by an amorphous community of states in which self-interest
trumps the global common good. In its unwieldiness, the international
community today resembles a hydra, the many-headed serpent of Greek
mythology, with a sovereign state for each head. Its structure and administration

7

See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly Res No 217A (II), UN Doc
A/810 at Art 1 (1948) (UDHR).

8

We find references to peace as a fruit of justice in Isaiah 32:17: "The fruit of righteousness will be
peace."

9

Perhaps this is why the Preamble of the US Constitution positions justice before other values:
"We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice,
insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America." US Const, Preamble.

10

For a similar discussion, see Allen Buchanan, Jusice, Legiimag, and SelfDetermination: Moral
FoundationsforInternationalLaw 432 (Oxford 2007).
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have become obsolete. This Westphalian political system is facing one of its
most profound crises since the end of the Cold War.
Since the international community lacks both the ability to take common
action and universal awareness of common interests, it could be said to be more
like a partnership than a community in the strict sense." In a partnership,
"authority would never be needed except on account of some fault or
accident." 2 But in a true community, such as the global human community, all
members, regarded as free and equal, would be involved in a fair system of social
cooperation.' This community requires legal authority, acting through legal
institutions and ordered by a legal system.
Without undergoing a deep transformation, the current international
community can scarcely survive in this new "post-national constellation" 4 of
transnational, supranational, and global actors. Global interdependence is not
compatible with complete national sovereignty. As global interdependence
grows, a new pluralistic and global human community made up of all human
beings and based on the dignity of each person emerges. This Article argues that
this global human community should be organized according to a global rule of
law.' 5
The current international community is undergoing a process of
constitutionalization, which is transforming it into a global human community.
During this process, certain constitutional standards are being elevated to the
status of global legal "first principles" or "primary truths."" That does not
mean, however, that this new global human community would need a formal
it

This famous distinction comes from Yves R. Simon, A General Theory ofAuthority 29 (Notre Dame
1962).

12

Id at 31.

13

For a discussion in the same vein, but using the term "society" and not "community," see John
Rawls, Justice as Fairness:A Restatement 95-96 (Belknap 2001). In this paper, I do not differentiate,
as Rawls does, community from society. I use the term "community" and not "society" because it
is the term legal thinkers employ to refer to the international community. For the Rawlsian
difference between society and community, see id at 20-21, 198-200, and John Rawls, Political
Liberaism 40-43 (Columbia 1993).
See generally J(irgen Habermas, Die PostnadonaleKonstellation:PolischeEssays (Suhrkamp 1998). For
more on the legal implications of this posmational constellation, see generally Nico Krisch, Beyond
Constitutionalism:The PluralistStructure of PostnationalLaw(Oxford 2010).
For more on this concept, see Rafael Domingo, Gaius, Vattel, and the New GlobalLaw Paradigm,42
Eur J Intl L 627, 640-46 (2011). See also Gianluigi Palombella, The Rule of Law Beyond the State:
Failures, Promises, and Theory, 7 Intl J Const L 442 (2009). See generally Leonardo Morlino and
Gianluigi Palombella, eds, Rule of Law and Democracy: Inquiries into Internal and External Issues (Brill
2010); Gianluigi Palombella and Neil Walker, eds, Relocating the Rule ofLaw (Hart 2009).
See the expressions at the beginning of Federalist 31 (Hamilton), in The Federalist Papers 193
(Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed) ("In disquisitions of every kind there are certain primary
truths or first principles upon which all subsequent reasonings must depend.").

14

15

16
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written constitution, nor that it would have to be consolidated into one
comprehensive structure that thoroughly embraces all existing legal relations.
The same principles that inspired the constitutional nation-state cannot be
applied to this emerging community. The new constitutionalism is very far from
the idea of a single, global world-state.17 There is at its core no formal
constitution, no sovereign constituent power, but a certain "mindset," " a
"particular cognitive frame for the construction of legitimate authority,"" or
"authoritative standards of legitimacy for the exercise of public power wherever
it is located."2 0 Insofar as this Article argues that the new global human
community, like any community, needs a legitimate and dispersed global
authority, it works from the same assumptions as cosmopolitan
constitutionalism,21 although not exactly using the same tools, as the reader will
soon note. These approaches-global communitarianism and cosmopolitan
constitutionalism-are climbing different sides of the same mountain.
Nonetheless, it is important to note that the international community, under
the impact of globalization, is being transformed into a new community (novatio
communitatis) made up of new members, inspired by new principles, and based on
new ideas and ideals. 22 There are deep conceptual differences between the
current international community and this new global community. The most
important one is that the current international community is a community of
nation-states (communitas communitatum); the new global community, however, is a
community of individual persons (communitas omnium hominum). The implications
of moving the primary subject of international law from the nation-state to the
human person are so profound that they will change the very legal foundations
of public international law.23

17

18
19

20
21
22
23

For a general discussion, see generally J.H.H. Weiler and Marlene Wind, eds, European
ConstitutionalismBeyond the State (Cambridge 2003).
See Martti Koskenniemi, Constitutionalismas Mindset: Refections on Kantian Themes About International
Law and Globali.ation,8 Theoretical Inquiries L 9, 12 (2007).
Mattias Kumm, The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalsm:On The Relationsbp between Constitutionalism
in and beyond the State, in Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel P. Trachtman, eds, Ruling the World?
Constitutionalism,InternationalLaw, and Global Governance 321 (Cambridge 2009).
Martin Loughlin, What is Constitutionalisation?,in Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin, eds, The
Twiigbt ofConstitutionalism?47, 61 (Oxford 2010).
For an overview of the different dimensions of global constitutionalism, see Christine E.J.
Schwobel, Situating the Debate on Global Constitutionalism,8 Intl J Const L 611, 634 (2010).
For the differences between ideals and ideology, see J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution ofEurope: 'Do
the New Clothes Have an Emperor?" and Other Essays on European Integration 239-40 (Cambridge 1999).
Indeed, public law proceeds from private law and not vice versa (ex pnvato iure publicum). See
Rafael Domingo, The New Global Law 147-53, 187-88 (Cambridge 2010). For a different
approach to public law, see generally Martin Loughlin, FoundationsofPubc Law (Oxford 2010).
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II. FOUR ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE NEW
GLOBAL HUMAN COMMUNITY
This Article makes four arguments for the existence of a global human
community. These arguments, even though they are normative, are not merely
normative in the sense of a philosophical account (I do not provide and do not
claim to provide a prima philosophia). They are normative in the more legally
relevant way of articulating the normative foundations for the reconstruction,
interpretation, and progressive development of the existing global order.
Because the four arguments are rooted in the Western legal tradition, I use Latin
terms to refer to them: dignitas, usus, necessitas, and bonum commune. Each argument
in and of itself could justify the existence of this new community. They focus on
the same reality from different perspectives. The argument from dignitas refers to
the strong and inherent connection between humanity as a whole and the law as
a specific tool for ordering it. The usus argument is based on the relation
between humanity and the planet earth as the home of our species. The necessitas
argument is grounded in the concept of necessity as a source of binding law. If
necessity gives rise to law, then the necessity of protecting dignity and of
preserving the planet as a human home are sufficient grounds for the existence
of a global human community. Lastly, the bonum commune argument can be used
to defend the common good as a constituent element of the global human
community. 24 This Article starts with the dignitas argument because it supports
not only the existence of the global human community, but also the very idea of
law itself.
A. Dignitas
As a community of persons and not of nation-states, the global human
community is based on the personal dignity of the human being and not on
national sovereignty. The sovereign state is no longer the primary source
(fonsiuris) of international law. The dignity of the person has become the primary
source of all law, even international law.25 The reason is clear: without sovereign
states, there can still be law. There has been law for centuries, even during times
when there were no sovereign states. Yet no law can exist without persons
(nullum ius sine persona). Thus, law must emanate from the person (ex persona ius

24

25

This Article does not distinguish between normative ideas and positive ideas. This omission is due
to the interdisciplinary nature of this Article, which extends an international juridical approach to
philosophical, political, and social thought. Since the terminology of "normative" and "positive"
contains different connotations in each discipline, this Article instead addresses both normative
law and positive law simultaneously.
UDHR, Preamble, Art 1 (cited in note 7).
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oritur), from the inherent dignity of each person, and not from the state. 26 This
reasoning discredits the prior, Westphalian belief that law emanates from the
nation-state and instead supports the current mode of thought. However, this
does not mean that nation-states do not play an important role as principal
guarantors of dignity nor that they are irrelevant. What it does mean is that the
nation-state is not the only sphere where human dignity needs protection.
Dignity is the intrinsic link between law and the human person.2 7 From a
juridical perspective, dignity is the status of each person as a "bearer of rights"
and "law maker." It is what calls for the special protection that law must provide
to every human being, who is the origin, subject, and raison d'tre of all law.
Without the person, there is no dignity, and without dignity, there is no law.
Dignity is to the person what the nucleus is to the cell, what the heart is to the
human body. From the perspective of law, the person acts with dignity when he
or she acts justly, that is, in accordance with justice.
If law emanates from the person, the human being has to be the center of
any legal order, whether local, national, transnational, supranational, or global.
The current crisis of international law derives from its having been founded on
the self-interest of the sovereign state, without sufficient grounding in the
person, the real source of all law.28 The law, as the Roman jurist Hermogenian
indicated, has been constituted for the sake of human beings (hominum causa).29
Therefore, the law ought to be the servant of the person, and never the person a
dehumanized instrument in the hands of the law.
If this is true, then all human beings taken together, as "legal sources," must
constitute a legal community, which existed, at least conceptually, prior to the
emergence of the idea of nation-state as a legal community.30 This argument

26

For more on human dignity, see Domingo, The New GlobalLaw at 131-36 (cited in note 23).

27

See Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights: The 2009 Tanner Lectures at UC Berkeley *3 (New
York University School of Law Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working
Paper No 09-50 Sept 2009), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1461220 (visited Oct 2, 2011).
Although it is true, as Waldron recently affirms, that dignitas was historically considered a relative
concept and not an absolute one, I do not entirely subscribe to his legal approach. In my opinion,
one of the great contributions to the study of law in the twentieth century has been the effective
legal consideration of dignity as an absolute concept. See Domingo, The New GlobalLaw at 131-36
(cited in note 23).
For more about this argument, see generally Rafael Domingo, The Crisis of International Law, 42
Vand J Transnatt L 1543 (2009).
See Hermogenian, Codex Hermogenianus§ 1.5.2 (Adolphum Marcum 1842) (Gustavus Haenel, ed)
("Cum igitur hominum causa omneius constitutum sit." As translated by Kirsti Miller and Joseph
Miller: "Since all law has been established for the sake of human beings.").

28

29

30

See, for example, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), 999 UN Treaty Ser
171, 173 (1976) (ICCPR) (recognizing that the rights contained in the covenant "derive from the
inherent dignity of the human person").
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helps explain the development of universal human rights, which are the most
important expressions of human dignity. If no state has jurisdiction over all
humanity and yet human rights exist, it is because the state is not the primary
source of law; the person is. It follows that there already exists a legal
community composed of all human beings insofar as they are bearers of human
rights, which can only exist in the context of a human community."
The responsibility of protecting dignity rests primarily with all human
persons, and only secondarily with nation-states, which are legal creations of
human beings. So there is no reason to restrict the legal protection of dignity,
and its most important expression-human rights-to national or supranational
boundaries. Moreover, in a globalized world, dignity cannot be fully protected
unless there are global institutions representing humanity as a community of
human rights bearers. 32 This does not mean that dignity can only be protected in
a global jurisdiction, or that the protection of dignity at the global level will
always be more efficient than such protection at a lower level. It does mean that
dignity must be protected in all provinces of law, including the global legal
domain.33 This protection of human dignity at a global level has to begin,
empirically speaking, with the so-called "basic human rights," that is, rights
whose "enjoyment is essential to the enjoyment of all other rights." 34
The centrality of the person in the legal arena allows for the establishment
of an open constitutional global frameworkderived from a plurality of
constitutional sources, and not limited by a written constitution.3 s In this sense,
the view of the person, not the nation-state, as the center of the legal system
dovetails with modern constitutionalism's commitment to implementing
constitutional principles beyond the boundaries of sovereign states.36

31

32

See Tony Honore, The Human Community and Majority Rule, in Making Law Bind: Essays Legal and
Philosophical227,228 (Clarendon 1987).
For a similar argument, see id ("If,therefore, there is no human community, there are no human
rights.").

33
34

35

36

See Charles R. Beitz, The Idea ofHuman Rights 209-11 (Oxford 2009).
Charles R. Beitz and Robert E. Goodin, Introduction: Basic Rights and Beyond, in Charles R. Beitz
and Robert E. Goodin, eds, GlobalBasic Rights 1, 3-4 (Oxford 2009).
See Mattias Kumm, The Best of Times and the Worst of Times: Between ConstitutionalTriumphalism and
Nostalgia,in Dobner and Loughlin, eds, The Twi4ght of Constitutionalism?201, 203-04 (cited in note
20).
If the person were not at the core of the cosmopolitan paradigm, constitutionalism could not
operate in the global arena, because at the heart of constitutionalism there must be free, equal,
and rights-bearing persons joined by a government limited by checks and balances. See Loughlin,
What is Constitutionaisation?at 59 (cited in note 20). See also Anne Peters, Membership in the Global
Constitutional Community, in Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters, and Geir Ulfstein, eds, The
Constitutionalitationof InternationalLaw 155,179 (Oxford 2009).

570

I/ol. 12 No. 2

Domingo

The New GlobalHuman Community

B. Usus
The second argument for the existence of a global human community is the
peculiar juridical relationship that links humanity with its home: the earth. This
relationship, "usus of the earth,"3 7 is prior to and deeper than the relationship
between each sovereign state and its own territory and requires the
establishment of a particular legal human community encompassing all the
inhabitants of the earth (communio).
Thanks to the phenomenon of globalization and the expanding body of
scientific knowledge about the earth, legal thinkers are now better able to
determine the legal nature of the relationship between the earth and humanity.
On the one hand, globalization affects this relationship by increasing territorial
interdependence. On the other hand, expanding scientific knowledge of the
planet affects this juridical relationship by clarifying its content, since the rights
of a holder depend on the nature of the thing (res) held."
If there is no absolute ownership over the earth, it follows that there could
be no absolute ownership of a part of the earth. Traditionally, however,
international lawyers have applied to plots of land the Roman legal doctrine of
private ownership (dominium) and its different modes of acquisition." In the five
classic modes of acquiring territory according to international law-occupation,
accretion, cession, conquest, and prescription-it is easy to see strong
similarities between the doctrines of international law regarding the distribution
of the earth and the ancient Roman law of dominium. 40
37

38

The expression brings to mind Schmittian connotations. This Section constitutes a critique of the
doctrinal exegesis articulated by Carl Schmitt in Der Nomos der Erde im Volkerrecht des Jvs Publicum
Europaeum (Duncker & Humblot 4th ed 1997).
It is very different to be the owner of a car, which is very short-lived, than to be the owner of a
painting by Picasso, called to endure for centuries and forever attributed to Picasso.

39

See, for example, Hugo Grotius, 1 De fure Belli et Pads Libri Tres § 2.3.3 (John W. Parker 1853)
(William Whewell, trans) (referring to the Paulus enumeration of the modes of acquisition). In any
case, the same Grotius recognizes that this Roman ius genium is not immutable. See id at S 2.8.26
("Haec ideo annotavimus, ne quis reperta juris gentium voce apud Romani juris auctores statim id
jus intelligat quod mutari non possit." As translated by William Whenwell: "We have noted these
things, in order that when anyone finds the term jursgendum in the Roman jurists, he may not, as
a matter of course, understand that jus which is immutable."). For an additional reference, see also
Alberico Gentili, 1 De lure Belli Libri Tres § 1.1 (Clarendon 1933) (ames Brown Scott, ed). For an
exploration of the influence of Roman law in the law of nations, see Benedict Kingsbury and
Benjamin Straumann, Introduction: The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations, in Benedict
Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann, eds, The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico
Gendili and the Justice ofEmpire 1, 1 (Oxford 2010).

4

This Roman doctrine can be found in Gaius, 1 The Institutes of Gaius 66-91 (Clarendon 1946)
(Francis de Zulueta, trans). It is very well explained in Francis de Zulueta, 2 The Institutes of Gaius:
Commentag 55-82 (Clarendon 1946). See also W.W. Buckland, A Text-Book of Roman Law frvm
Augustus tojustinian, 204-58 (Cambridge 3d ed 1966).

Winter 2012

571

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

The Roman doctrine of dominium became key for international law theorists
because the primary subject of international law, the nation-state, could not exist
without a territory. So the new theory of sovereignty, appearing for the first time
in Jean Bodin's Les Six Livres de la Republique (1576), was strongly associated with
Roman law, especially by Alberico Gentili, a great admirer of both Roman law41
and the theories of Bodin, to whom he referred as "clarisimus jurisconsultus
terrae Galliae."42 Based on a famous fragment from the Institutes of Justinian,4 3
for instance, Gentili defended the permissibility of a king's disposing of a
territory without the people's permission."
The strong Absolutism of European nation-states in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries served to fuel this trend to such an extent that some
international theorists, especially John Selden, tried to apply the Roman doctrine
of dominion to ownership of the seas. They defended the proposition that the
sea could be made someone's property (mare clausum). They argued against the
doctrine, proposed by Hugo Grotius in his treatise Mare liberum (1609) and in his
subsequent work De Jure Belli et Pads Libri Tres (1625), that the sea cannot be
owned. The prevailing view among modern scholars, first established by
Cornelius van Bynkershoek in his work De Dominio Mars (1702), allows that
certain portions of the sea in close proximity to the land (mare terraeproximum)

41

42

See Gentili, 1 De lure Bel Libri Tres at § 1.3 (cited in note 39) ("[T]hat if the empire were
destroyed, the [Roman] law itself, although long buried, would yet raise again and diffuse itself
among all the nations of mankind.").
See id at § 1.1 ("I mean the above-mentioned Bodin and Peter Faber, most distinguished jurists of
the land of France."). For the influence of Bodin in Gentili, see Peter Schr6der, Vitoria, Gentli,
Bodin: Sovereignty and the Law ofNations, in Kingsbury and Straumann, eds, The Roman Foundations of
the Law ofNations at 169-81 (Oxford 2010) (cited in note 39).

43

See Paul Krueger, Institudones § 1.2.6, in Paul Krueger and Theodor Mommsen, eds, 1 Corpus iuis
ivilis (Apud Weidmann 16th ed 1954) ("Sed et quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem, cum
lege regia, quae de imperio eius lata est, populus ei et in eum omne suum imperium et potestatem
concessit." As translated by Kirsti Miller and Joseph Miller: "But that which has pleased the
prince, has the force of law, since by the royal law, which was made concerning his power, the
people have granted to him and lodged in him all their power and authority."); Theodor
Mommsen, Digesta § 1.4.1, in Krueger and Mommsen, eds, I Corpus inds dviis ("Quod principi
placuit, legis habet, vigorem: utpote cum lege regia, quae de imperio eius lata est, populus ei et in
eum omne suum imperium et potestatem conferat." As translated by Kirsti Miller and Joseph
Miller: "That which has pleased the prince, has the force of law: since by royal law, which was
made concering his power, the people confer on him and lodge in him all their power and
authority.").

44

Gentili, 1 De lure Bel Libri Tres at § 3.15 (cited in note 39) ("But as regards the emperor of Rome
one might have had a different opinion: 'since by law of sovereignty, which was passed with
respect to his powers, the people granted to him full dominion and power over themselves."').
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are susceptible of exclusive dominion, but the open sea is a common possession
of all people (res communis omnium) because no settlement can be formed on it.45
Under the application of the doctrine of dominium to international law, just
as the Roman owner (dominus) has the right to use, enjoy, possess, and dispose of
things in the most absolute way, so also does each sovereign state have an
absolute and exclusive right over its own territory, which would include a
definite portion of the surface of the earth, territorial waters, and the atmosphere
above. One consequence of applying this Roman doctrine of dominium to the
territory of the sovereign state was that the land of the earth, along with its
territorial waters as far as the stars (usque ad sidera), was considered the result of
the partition of the earth as such, with the capacity for different absolute
owners-that is, the nation-states-to own the part of the earth that was their
territory as an independent partitioned entity. Under the theory of dominium,
these nation-states, as absolute and full owners of their respective territories,
have the power to dispose of it. Emer de Vattel is radical on this point: "Those
who think otherwise[] cannot allege any solid reason for their opinion."4 6
The land of the earth has been divided into a multitude of territories that we
call sovereign states, breaking up the communio of humanity. Beginning with
Gentili, 47 the international community was considered a community of equal
nation-states ruled by private law standards.4 8 The idea of a global and public
commonwealth de iure, so present in Francisco de Vitoria's prior work,49
gradually declined in importance in the realm of international law, which was
conceived more as a law between and among different absolute owners than as a
law between and among common users.
But dominium's doctrine of ownership and fragmentation of the earth does
not reflect humanity's real relationship with it. The role of the earth is unique,
since humanity needs it to survive as a species. It is for this reason that the earth
is sometimes called "Mother Earth." The earth is an indivisible unit that allows
for solidary exploitation and preferential rights of possession but not for a

45

For further information, see Henry Wheaton, HistoU of the Law of Nations in Europe and America;
(Gould, Banks 1845).
Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations; or Princles of the Law of Nature,Applied to the Conduct and Afairs
of Nations and Sovereigns § 1.21.257 (T &J.W. Johnson 1861) (Joseph Chitty, ed).

from the EarliestTimes to the Treaty of Washington, 1842 152-58
46

47
48

9

See generally Gentili, 1 De lure Belli Libri Tres at § 1.21 (cited in note 39).
See id. For a contrast between the two different conceptions of the global legal community in
Vitoria and Gentili, see Andreas Wagner, Frandsco de Vitoria and Albeico Gentii on the Legal
Character of the Global Commonwealth, 31 Oxford J Legal Studies 565 (2011). For a more general
discussion, see also Anthony Pagden, Gentili, Vitoria, and the Fabrication of a 'Natural Law of
Naions,"in Kingsbury and Straumann, eds, Roman Foundations340 (cited in note 39).
See, for example, Vitoria, On Citil Power at 5 21 (cited in note 6) ("The whole world, which is in a
sense a commonwealth, has the power to enact laws which are just and convenient to all men.").
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permanent or absolute division among owners. Indivisibility among several
owners presupposes solidarity and common responsibility. An indivisible thing
can only be governed either by a single owner or an indivisible community;
therefore, humanity must be construed as a community.
The Roman term usus is the best term to express the combined ideas of
solidarity and indivisibility. Over the centuries the meaning of the Roman term
usus has evolved along with the concept of ownership. 0 Here usus has to be
understood in opposition to dominium, which refers to full and absolute
ownership. Usus is what dominium is not, and refers to those uses that do not alter
the nature of the things used (rerum natura). In this sense, any act of
environmental protection, administration, or enjoyment, insofar as it does not
alter the thing itself (res) but only what the thing produces (fructus), as well as
temporary or permanent possession (possessio) in its more general sense, is a part
of usus.5 ' So usus excludes only those acts that imply an absolute ownership over
the earth (dominium), such as acts of disposal (habere), and, of course, of abuse
(abusus).
Therefore, as I use the term herein, usus of the earth means that humanity
has the rights and derivative duties of long-term use-that is, it has usus in the
strictest sense: rights to full enjoyment (fructus) and complete possession
(possessio) of the planet, but not to alienation (babere). The necessary distribution
of the land between and among political communities is not by way of absolute
ownership, as some international thinkers thought, but through usus. In fact,
throughout the world, there is no such thing as absolute ownership of the
earth.52 Therefore, it would be wrong to consider humanity as a full owner of the
earth (domina mundi).
Why is this so? Firstly, humanity is so dependent upon the earth that it
could not survive apart from it. Thus, humanity does not have disposal
capacities over it. Nor is alienation possible since there would be no counterpart
to humanity to receive the alienated good. Secondly, the earth as a unified whole
50

51

52

For an explanation of the word usus in Roman law, see Buckland, A Text-Book of Roman Law at
120-21, 273-74 (cited in note 40); Max Kaser, 1 Das rimische Privatrecht § 106 (Oscar Beck 2d ed
1971).
Historically, the term usus can also embrace both aspects. For more on this dichotomy, see
Giuseppe Grosso, Usufrutto e FigureAffini nel Diritto Romano 85-87, 313-40 (G. Giappichelli 2d ed
1958); Max Kaser, Eigentum und Besitq im Alteren Roimischen Recht 87-88, 313-40 (B6hlau 2d ed
1956) ("Es ist wohl unbestritten, da8 'usu/ ein alter Ausdruck ffir den Besitz ist." As translated by
Kirsti Miller and Joseph Miller: "It is quite uncontested that 'usus' is an old usage for
possession.").
See also Alvaro d'Ors, La Posesidn del Espaio 14 (Civitas 1998) (arguing that with respect to
space--conceived of as the "totality of the perceptible environment"-and thus with respect to
any specific instance of it, there is possession but not ownership, as translated by Rafael
Domingo).
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is indivisible. This is so because a potential division of the earth into different
spheres of absolute ownership would alter substantially the very nature of the
earth. Absolute ownership, on the contrary, is by definition divisible, at least
legally. Indeed, a co-owner without the capacity to alienate his part of a
commonly owned item would not be a true absolute owner. The agreement
between co-owners not to divide their common property thus prevents them
from being true absolute owners. In a common absolute ownership, there are no
absolute co-owners but only relative ones, because common ownership limits
the power of all co-owners. Absolute ownership involves ultimate rights over a
thing. It is a signoria,53 and humanity does not have this right.
The doctrine of "usus of the earth" tries to recover the key idea that
humanity rather than the community of states has ultimate responsibility for the
protection of the earth. The usus of the earth also grants to every human being
the right to use the planet as a home. Each human being, as a "co-user" of the
earth, becomes a member of a single community, which has the right and the
power to govern and administer this usus of the earth. This communo in usa
requires the recognition of humanity as a legal community.
C. Necessitas
The third argument for the existence of a real global community is necessity
(necessitas) as a source of binding law. Necessitas was the Roman goddess who
personified the constraining force of destiny, the inevitable. She was identified
with the Greek goddess Ananke and was depicted as a powerful goddess who
walked before Fortuna carrying brazen nails and wedges54 to fix fast the decrees
of Fate. 5 Opposed to free will (libera voluntas), necessitas is a force or influence
that compels an unwilling person or a group of persons to act.
Necessity affects the law in two different ways. Sometimes the plea of
necessity should be taken into consideration for the purpose of legally justifying
a departure from ordinary law. An example is the doctrine of necessity in
international law, which is based on the rule that the law does not apply when

s3

See Buckland, A Text-Book of Roman Law at 188 (cited in note 40) ("signoria" is Italian for
"lordship" and was the form of government in medieval and Renaissance city-states in Italy).

54

See Horace, Odes and Epodes 5§ 1.35.17-20 (Harvard 2004) (Niall Rudd, trans) ("me semper anteit
saeva Necessitas, / clavos trabalis et cuneos manu / gestans aena, nec severus / uncus abest
liquidumque plumbum." As translated by Niall Rudd: "Ruthless Necessity always strides in front
of you, carrying beam nails and wedges in her brazen hand, not forgetting the immovable clamp
and lead for melting down.").

55

See Wagner, Necessitas, in W.H. Roscher, ed, 3:1 Ausfilhrliches Lexikon der Griechischen und Ro'mischen
Mythologie columns 70-72 (B.G. Teubner 1902).
See Black's Law Dictionary1053 (West 7th ed 1999).
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necessity comes into play (cessat lex ubi venit necessitas)." Sometimes, however,
necessity creates law by grounding legal obligations and duties. This is reflected in
the well-known legal French aphorism: ncessiti oblige." Thus necessity becomes
an important source of law, that is to say, of binding legal obligation. I am using
the concept of necessity in this latter way, though the two legal implications are
inherently interconnected: anything with power to suspend laws must also be
able to create them. Otherwise, society would dissolve into chaos.
It is no mere coincidence that in the wording of the most famous definition
of obligatio, from Justinian's Institutes," there appears the word "necessity." In this
context, necessity expresses the idea that the legal bond created by obligation
constrains the wishes of the party (necessitate adstringimur). This definition of
obligation entered the Anglo-American common law tradition in the thirteenth
century through the work of Henry de Bracton's De legibus et consuetudinibus
Angliae, who adapts the first part of the wording used in Justinian's Institutes"iuris vinculum quo necessitate adstringimur."'o
In the Roman jurist Modestinus's first book of legal rules, he aptly
expressed the concept of necessity, saying, "Ergo omne ius aut consensus fecit
aut necessitas constituit aut firmavit consuetudo": "Thus, all law has been made
either by consent, or established by necessity, or confirmed by custom." 6 ' As
used by Modestinus, the term "necessity" has its ordinary, non-technical
meaning: an imperative need or desire, a pressure of circumstances, a physical or

57

Accursius, Digestum Vetus sea Pandertarum luris Ciilis § 1.10.1 note o (Editio Postrema 1575). For a
commentary on this rule and other similar rules, see Rafael Domingo, ed, Princiios de Derecho
Global: 1000 Reglas, Princpiosy Aforismos Juridicos Comentados 146 (Thomson Aranzadi 2d ed 2006).
There is a similar meaning in the well-known statement by Cicero that applies to war: "[S]ilent
enim leges inter arma." As translated by N.H. Watts: "When arms speak, the laws are silent."
Cicero, Pro Milone § 4.11 (Harvard 2d ed 1953) (N.H. Watts, trans).
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Ncessiti oblge means that when a need exists, a concomitant legal obligation arises. As Honor6
puts it: "[I]n the last resort necessity makes law: neressiti obhge." Tony Honor6, Nicessiti Obige, in
Making Law Bind: Essays Legal and Philosophical 129 (Clarendon 1987). The difference between
obligation and duty is that an obligation always requires a voluntary agreement; a duty, however,
does not because it derives from a law. A different meaning, but close to this, is offered by H.L.A.
Hart, The Concept ofLaw 82-91 (Oxford 2d ed 1997).
Krueger, Instituiones at § 3.13 (cited in note 43) ("[O]bligatio est iuris vinculum, quo necessitate
adstringimur alicuius solvendae rei secundum nostrae civitatis iura." As translated by Kirsti Miller
and Joseph Miller: "An obligation is a legal binding whereby we are bound by a necessity of
performing some act according to the laws of our community.").
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60

61

Henry de Bracton, 2 On the Laws and Customs of England 283 (Belknap 1968) (George E.
Woodbine, ed) (Samuel E. Thorne, trans) ("Et sciendum quod obligatio est iuris vinculum quo
necessitate astringimur ad aliquid dandum vel faciendum." As translated by Samuel E. Thorne:
"An obligation is a legal bond whereby we are constrained, whether we wish to or not, to give or
do something.").
Mommsen, Digestaat § 1.3.40 (cited in note 43).
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moral compulsion, which excuses the non-fulfillment of an existing obligation or
creates a new one. 62
In his second book of rules, Modestinus again refers to necessity as a source
of legal obligation (obkgamur necessitate).63 He says that those persons "who are
not allowed to do anything other than that which they are ordered to do are
bound by necessity." 6 He cites the example of the necessary heirs (necesarii
heredes), that is, those heirs compelled to serve as heirs without power to refuse
the inheritance (for instance, those subordinated to the patria potestas of the
deceased who became sui iurisupon his death).
Today, a strong sense of contractualism has fueled disregard for the
tripartition of sources of law into consent, custom, and necessity, thereby
relegating custom and necessity to irrelevance. Custom, however, has succeeded
in maintaining its (admittedly secondary) status in the international realm due to
the very nature of international law, and thanks, in part, to the defense of
customary international law promoted by some international scholars in recent
years.66 But we still need to recover the concept of necessity in order to develop
the correct approach to the law in this era of globalization. As Tony Honore
aptly puts it, "As regards the world community necessity is the relevant
ground."6 The reason was already explained by Francisco de Vitoria, based on
Aristotelian thought: necessary causes are final causes.
Because of globalization, relationships between and among human beings
have become necessary for humanity to manage its global needs well. Some of
62

63

64

6s

6

In this vein, see Theo Mayer-Maly, Topik der Necessitas, in Etudes offertes d jean Macqueron 477, 477
(Faculte de Droit et des Sciences Economiques 1970) ('Wenn Juristen von Notwendigkeit
sprechen, so machen sie damit eine Anleibe bei der Um angssprache." As translated by Kirsti Miller
and Joseph Miller: "When jurists speak of necessity, they speak colloquially.").
See Mommsen, Digesta at § 44.7.52 (cited in note 43) ("Obligamur aut re aut verbis aut simul
utroque aut consensu aut lege aut iure honorario aut necessitate aut ex peccato." As translated by
Rafael Domingo: "We are bound either by real obligation, or by formal words, or by both of
these at the same time, or by consent, or by statute, or by praetorian law, or by necessity, or by
wrongdoing.").
Id ("Necessitate obligantur, quibus non licet aliud facere quam quod praeceptum est.")
(Translation in text by Rafael Domingo).
Indeed, in cases in which it is difficult to achieve an agreement between states due to the strong
disagreement between them, custom could play an important role. For this and other areas in
which customary law is developed, see Antonio Cassese, International Law 166 (Oxford 2d ed
2005).
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See generally Amanda Perreau-Saussine and James B. Murphy, eds, The Nature of Customat Law
Legal Historical and Philosophical Perspectives (Cambridge 2007); Brian D. Lepard, Customay
InternationalLaw: A New Theof with PracticalApplications (Cambridge 2010); David J. Bederman,
Custom as a Source ofLaw (Cambridge 2010).
Honore, The Human Community and Majority Rule at 237 (cited in note 31).

68

See Vitoria, On Civil Power at §§ 2-6 (cited in note 6).
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those needs derive directly from human dignity (for example, eradicating poverty
and combating international terrorism). Thus, necessitas and dignitas are
intertwined. The necessity of protecting human dignity justifies the existence of
a global community because this is the only framework in which human dignity
can be comprehensively protected.
There are other global issues, such as environmental stewardship, which
reflect the necessity of preserving, protecting, and caring for our planet as the
home for human beings of all generations. In this case, necessitas and usus are also
connected. This necessity to protect our planet requires joint action that cannot
flourish within the current international framework. Therefore, the very
existence of a global community becomes a legal necessity.
In a certain sense, this global community (paraphrasing the Roman jurists)
could be called "incidental" or spontaneous (communio incidens). Such a
community arises not by an explicit prior agreement among its members, but by
necessity. Even so, it is no less a real community and certainly no less worthy of
being further developed as such. I agree with David Kennedy when he affirms
that "it would be surprising if the new order were waiting to be found rather
than made." 9 What humanity has to do is to organize legally the global social
contract,70 that is, to create the constitutional framework that permits it to be
ordered under a global rule of law.7 ' By doing this, the global human community
would meet the legal obligations arising out of the necessities of protecting
human dignity and preserving the planet.
D. Bonum Commune
The fourth argument focuses on the existence of a common good (bonum
commune) that calls for a global human association to advance and protect it.72 I
prefer the expression "common good" to "public interest," "public good," or
"general welfare," among others, for several reasons. First, it has a longstanding

69

David Kennedy, The Mystery of Global Governance, in Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel P. Trachtman, eds,
RuAng the World? Constitutionalism,InternationalLaw, and Global Governance 37, 39 (Cambridge 2009).

70

See also David Held, Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus
161-69 (Polity 2004) (discussing "global social democracy").
For more on this concept, see generally Domingo, 42 Eur J Intl L at 627 (cited in note 15). See

71

72

also Palombella, 7 Intl J Const L at 442 (cited in note 15); Morlino and Palombella, eds, Rule of
Law and Democracy (cited in note 15); and Palombella and Walker, eds, Relocating the Rule of Law
(cited in note 15).
Pope Benedict XVI referred to the global common good in an encyclical letter: "In an
increasingly globalized society, the common good and the effort to obtain it cannot fail to assume
the dimensions of the whole human family, that is to say, the community of peoples and nations."
Pope Benedict XVI, Charity in Truth, § 7 (Vatican June 29, 2009).

578

Vol. 12 No. 2

Domingo
g

The New Global Human Communiy

tradition73 that should not be interrupted; second, it is broader than the other
expressions since it better integrates the legal dimensions of both private and
public justice; and lastly, law, by nature, is more related to the good (bona)74 than
to public interest and welfare.
Indeed, the right and the good are
7
6
complementary. David Hollenbach is right to say that "[t]he idea of the
common good is an idea whose time has once again come."77
The global common good is the added value resulting from the formation
of a global community to achieve the ends of global justice for the sake of all
human beings. The common good of the global human community cannot be
fully identified with the so-called "universal common good" of humanity. 8 The
global human community, although it is made up of all human beings, does not
embrace all goods, needs, and aspirations of humanity. The bonum commune of the
global human community is only a part of the "universal common good."
The concept of the global common good does not entail that all members
of the community, in our case, humanity, must share the same values or the
same ideals.7 ' All citizens are free to have their own conception of the good. The
common good is completely compatible with all those ideas that do not go
against essential human sociability and global justice. The common good
encourages pluralism but is not always totally neutral, 0 even if it has been
derived from an "overlapping consensus," to use the famous expression of John
Rawls."
The whole of the global common good is not simply greater than the sum
of its parts. It is something essentially different. The sum of its parts is one way
73

For the development of the concept, see generally Herfried Miinkler and Harald Bluhm, eds, 1
Gemeinwohl und Gemeinsinn: Historische Semantiken PolitischerLeitbegriffe (Akademie Verlag 2001).

74

The Roman jurist Celsus famously definied law as "ars boni et aequi," or the art of goodness and
justice, as translated by Kristi and Joseph Miller. Mommsen, Digesta at 5 1.1.1 (cited in note 43).
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See also David Hollenbach, The Common Good and Christian Ethics 7-9 (Cambridge 2002).
See the same argument in Rawls, Justice as Fairness at 140 (cited in note 13) ("The right and the
good are complementary; any conception of justice, including a political conception, needs both,
and the priority of right does not deny this.").
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77
78

79
so
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Hollenbach, The Common Good at 243 (cited in note 75) ("[W]e need both a renewed understanding
of the common good and a revitalized social commitment to it.").
See Second Vatican Council, PastoralConstitution on the Church in the Modern World: Gaudium Et Spes,
§ 2.3.68, § 2.5.84 (Vatican Dec 7, 1965). For an overview of this expression in various Vatican
documents, see Paolo G. Carozza, The UniversalCommon Good and the Autority of [nternationalLaw,
9 Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 28, 31-41 (2006), with an extensive
bibliography.
See also John Finnis, NaturalLaw andNaturalRghts156 (Clarendon 1980).
For a different approach, see Rawls, Justice as Fairnessat 21 (cited in note 13).
For the relation between good and overlapping consensus, see Rawls, Polticalliberalism at 150-54
(cited in note 13) and Rawls, Justice as Fairnessat 32-38, 140-45 (cited in note 13).
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to describe what something truly is, but that is not all that it is. 8 2 How the parts
are composed inherently affects the whole. For example, if the common good
were considered only from the standpoint of a mathematical construct, it would
concern only quantitative results. In that case, there would be no such thing as
the "fair distribution" of wealth because fairness is not a mathematical concept.
However, if we do not limit ourselves to such a constraint, then the fair
distribution of wealth is a significant issue for the common good, to the extent
that this distribution affects global justice, which is a constitutive element of the
common good.8

Thanks to the common good, the global human community thrives. It is the
global community's lifeblood. The global community would disintegrate if it
failed to bring global justice to bear in the defense of human dignity and the
preservation of the earth.
The common good is the final justification for the existence of the global
human community (as distinct from humanity) since it embraces the three
previous arguments. If there is a global human community, it is because there is
a need to establish such a community to protect human dignity and preserve the
earth, which can only be achieved in a global context. And if such a necessity
exists, there arises a concomitant legal obligation (nicessiti oblige). In short, the
global common good is the driving force in protecting human dignity and
preserving the planet, and the necessity of achieving those aims creates legal
obligations to the global human community.
III. MAIN FEATURES OF THE GLOBAL HUMAN COMMUNITY
The nature of the global community determines both the structure of its
legal system and its legal authority. In this Section, this Article argues that the
new global human community has six defining attributes. It is (A) a political
community; (B) composed of persons, not of nation-states; (C) universal in
nature; (D) of compulsory membership; (E) incomplete; and (F) complementary.
These key features are intrinsically intertwined and serve to highlight the
differences between the global human community and the international
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See Thomas Aquinas, 37 Summa Theologie 2a2oe Question 58.7 (Blackfriars 1975) ("[B]onum
commune civitatis et bonum singulare unius personae non differunt solum secundum multum et
paucum, sed secundum formalem differentiam. Alia enim est ratio boni communis et boni
singularis, sicut alia est ratio totius et partis." As translated by Rafael Domingo: "The common
good of the State and the particular good of the individual person differ, not just quantitatively as
the large and the little, but in kind; the meaning of the common good is other than that of an
individual good, as the meaning of a whole is not that of a part.").
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For a development of this argument, see Antonio Millan Puelles, Persona Humana) Jusdicia Social
41-57 (Ediciones Rialp 1962).
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community in which the old (Grotian, Hobbesian, Kantian) and new paradigms
coexist.84
A. A Political Community
This Article takes a juridical perspective, thus its approach to the global
human community aims to be legal, not political. That does not mean that the
global human community is not a political community or that our globalized
world requires merely a sort of global legal public authority and not a political
one. If the term "political community" is identified with the Aristotelian concept
of polis as the paradigm of a complete community,85 then today the term
"political community" would be exclusively yet improperly a concept reserved
for the sovereign state, and not for the nascent global human community. If the
term is used in the narrow sense used by John Rawls, which is that of a "political
society united on one (partially or fully) comprehensive religious, philosophical,
or moral doctrine,"" then the global human community is not a "political
community," but a "political society." However, if we understand a political
community as an institutional system of social cooperation governed by a legal
authority under the rule of law, as I do here, we must also affirm that the global
human community is a political community in the strictest sense, and that
managing the global order is quintessentially a political problem. 7
Managing the global order requires an understanding of the nature of the
global polity. The global human community can neither be defined only in terms
of horizontal interaction between different social actors through global publicprivate networks and common policies nor simply as a vertical community based
on coercive hierarchical control. It is a suigeneris political community requiring a
dispersed authority, distributed across different global institutions, and based on
the rule quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus approbetur "[Wjhat affects everyone must be
approved by everyone."" This rule would be, using H.L.A. Hart's terminology,
the rule of recognition of the legal system of the global human community."
Thus, the nature of authority in the global human community is both legal and
political.

8
85

See Cassese, InternationalLaw at 21 (cited in note 65).
Aristotle, Poliics 1.1 (Harvard 1959) (H. Rackham, trans).
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See Rawls, PolticalLiberalism at 40-43, 201 (cited in note 13) and Rawls, Justice as Fairness at 20,
199-200 (cited in note 13).
See Andrew Hurrell, On Global Order Power, Values, and the Constitution of InternationalSoiety 2-8
(Oxford 2007).
For a commentary on this rule, see Domingo, The New Global Law at 144-45 (cited in note 23).
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Hart, The Concept oflaw at 94-110 (cited in note 58).
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B. A Community of Persons, Not of Nation-States
The global human community is first and foremost a community of human
persons, not a society or federation of states "over whom there is no human
power established," as Thomas Hobbes, among others, argued."0 It can be said
of the global human community what Jean Monnet applied to the unification of
Europe: "We are not bringing together nation-states, we are uniting people.""
The only way for persons to work together in a global context would be through
different global institutions, supranational entities, nations, transnational
corporations, NGOs, and other non-state actors92 that integrate the global
human community. However, working through these global actors does not
remove the person as a global citizen from the spotlight. Perhaps this is the
most significant difference between the current international community and the
new global human community. The person is the key that opens the door to a
new constitutionalism beyond the state.
One consequence of recognizing the global human community as a
community of equal persons and not of nation-states is the application of
majority rule. In a community of equals, if members cannot reach a unanimous
decision, the majority has the right to act for the whole. Since the global human
community is a community of equal persons, majority rule comes into play.93 We
can see why Francisco de Vitoria believed that this rule could be applied to the
world community and that a majority of Christians could appoint a monarch
over the whole of Christendom. He said, "Once the commonwealth assumes the
right to administer itself, and once the principle of majority rule is established, it
may adopt whatever constitution it prefers." 94
Majority rule, however, cannot be applied to a society of sovereign states,
legally considered equals, since this would be too strong a limitation on the
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Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan § 2.22.29 (Oxford 1996) (.C.A. Gaskin, ed).

91

Jean Monnet, Mimoires 9 (Fayard 1976) ("Nous ne coalisons pas des ttats, nous unissons des
hommes.") (Translation in text by Raphael Domingo).
For more on these new actors, see Anne Peters, Lucy Koechlin, and Gretta Fenner Zinkernagel,
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Non-State Actors as Standard Setters: Framing the Issue in an InterdisaiplinaryFashion, in Anne Peters,
Lucy Koechlin, and Gretta Fenner Zinkernagel, eds, Non-State Actors as Standard Setters 1, 1-32
(Cambridge 2009).
93

See this argument in Grotius, Dejur Bel et PacisLibri Tres at § 2.5.17 (cited in note 39) (including
references to different authors of antiquity). See also John Locke, Second Treatise, in Peter Laslett,
ed, John Locke: Two Treatisesof Government § 97 (Cambridge student ed 1988) ("And thus every Man,
by consenting with others to make one Body Politick under one Government, puts himself under
an Obligation to every one of that Society, to submit to the determination of the majority, and to
be concluded by it.').

94

Vitoria, On Civil Powerat § 14 (cited in note 6).
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sovereignty of each state." The fact that some international actors have recently
tried to apply this rule in the international arena signals the ongoing
transformation of the international law paradigm into a new global law
paradigm.
C. A Universal Community
The global human community is universal because it includes each and
every human being without exception. But universality is not totality. Whatever
is universal is common to all, and general as opposed to particular, that is,
specific to a group of persons or communities. Whatever is total, however, is
comprehensive and all encompassing, as opposed to partial and incomplete.
What is universal may or may not be total, and vice versa, for there can be
particular totalities, like the nation-state as it has been traditionally conceived.
The international community is the sum of particular totalities, that is, sovereign
states. The global human community, however, is a universal but incomplete
(not total) community that embraces humanity.
This is why the global human community cannot be structured as a
sovereign world-state or a federation of sovereign states. To exist, a sovereign
state requires the existence of at least one other state susceptible to being
excluded from its territorial jurisdiction. There is no sovereign state without
other sovereign states." The concept of the state requires otherness: in order to
exist, there must be at least two of its kind. One is not enough."
One of the goals of this global human community would be to prevent the
creation of a world government that holds all the powers of a state, which would
be, in the words of Hannah Arendt, "the end of all political life as we know
it""-the end of liberty itself. The founding of a global, state-like government
would mark the triumph of imperialism, which aims to turn the universal into
the total in order to establish a homogeneous and coercive worldwide governing
structure. This worldwide imperialism would present mankind with its greatest
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According to the famous Schmittian view, which I do not share, the reason for this is the
essentially antagonistic nature of politics, expressed in the dualism of "friend and enemy." Carl
Schmitt, The Concept of the Political36 (Chicago expanded ed 2007) (George Schwab, trans).
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threat. In the global law paradigm, for the sake of freedom and pluralism, total
legal structures like nation-states cannot be universalized. Humanity as such is
universal and total, but the legal-political structures that govern it should not be.
Therefore, the human global community must be, by definition, universal, but
not total.99
D. A Community of Compulsory Membership
The most important consequence of universality is that the global human
community is a non-voluntary community. 00 Consent is not a requirement for
becoming a member and indeed is impossible: no human being could ever leave
this community. Therefore, the global human community has the legal authority
to impose obligations without the express consent of all its members. This kind
of non-voluntary membership is only possible in an incomplete community, like
the family for example, not in a complete community, like the nation-state,
which would require voluntary membership, if not always with respect to
becoming a member,'o' then at least with respect to leaving the community.
Compulsory membership must be balanced by a high degree of citizen
participation in the decision-making process.
This strong non-voluntary membership is the polar opposite of the
essentially voluntary membership of free and equal nation-states in the
international community, born at Westphalia and based on the principle of free
recognition of independent states as the highest expression of sovereignty.
Nonetheless, over the past few decades the international community has been
moving from a voluntary membership paradigm, based on nation-state consent,
to an involuntary one, closer to the paradigm of the global human community.
The key to this shift has been the growing realization that the act of recognition
of a state is a merely declaratory and political act, independent of the state's
existence as a full subject of international law.' 0 2
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Perhaps an analogy to the English language will help. English is the most universal language, but
it cannot become total, unique, absolute, exclusive of the other languages in such a way that it
alone is used everywhere. So the defense of English as the universal language of communication
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For the legal consequences of compulsory membership in communities, see Honor6, Nicessiti
Obhge at 120-21 (cited in note 58).
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Most national legal orders provide that individuals become subjects of law by birth or even at
conception, that is, without consent. See, for example, US Const, Amend XIV ("All persons born
or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
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Although we regard the act of recognition itself as having no legal bearing
on the international status of a sovereign state, a society of states could never be
fully considered a non-voluntary membership community that is different from
the global human community. Each human being has the right to be recognized
as a member of the global human community. A nation-state, however, has no
right to be recognized as such by other members of the international
community.103 Therefore, compulsory membership is a feature of the global
human community that applies uniquely to individual human beings and never
to nation-states.
E. An Incomplete Community
The global human community is incomplete because, although it embraces
all humanity, its point would not be the ultimate fulfillment of all human needs
but only those global needs that affect humanity as a whole. I agree with
Aristotle and Aquinas in seeing the polis104 or civitas105 as the only complete and
self-sufficient community, even though their views were based on "a premature
generalization from incomplete empirical data."10 Globalization does not
require the establishment of a universal and complete community (communitas
perfecfissima). The end purpose of the global human community would be to
serve human beings living within the existing complete communities, such as the
polis, civitas, respublica,commonwealth, nation-states, and so on, to the extent that
these communities cannot achieve global fulfillment of certain needs on their
own.
Addressing the needs arising from globalization creates a paradox, namely
that the so-called pefrectae communitates require the support of an incomplete
community: the global human community. Therefore, complete communities
like those no longer exist in fact but as aspirations. The existing complete
communities aspire to be complete, but in reality they are not. They need the
support of the global human community, which is an incomplete community.
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Theologix at 2a2x Question 65.2 (cited in note 82); Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle's
Politics 5 1.1.23 (Hackett 2007) (Richard J. Regan, trans). For more on the concept of
"communitas perfecta" in Thomas Aquinas, see John Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal
Theory 52, 114, 122, 219, 221 & n 10, 226, 307 (Oxford 1998).
Finnis, Natural .aw at 148 (cited in note 79).

106

Winter 2012

585

Chicago Joumalof InternationalLaw

Since the members of the communitasperfecta are also members of the global
human community, this community is, in some ways, inherently integrated into
each national political community (in quibus), and the national community
manifests itself at the global level through its members, who are also members
of the global human community (ex quibus). This is possible because the global
human community is not a community of communities but a community of all
human beings, who live primarily in complete political communities.
It would be a serious mistake to try to govern the global human community
as a complete community. The nature and competencies of any global authority
should approximate the ideal of global governance under the rule of law rather
than a world government. 107

F. A Complementary Community
The global human community is complementary in nature-the incomplete
global human community complements complete national political communities.
The complete and incomplete must coexist to address world needs. This
complementarity is based on the principles of solidarity and subsidiarity. These
two interrelated principles are the pillars of the new emerging global human
community insofar as it is a community of persons, not of nation-states. In the
current international community, these societal principles can only be applied
with great difficulty, due to their fundamental incompatibility with sovereignty in
its original sense. Solidarity is an expression of the social nature of human
beings; subsidiarity is an implication of personal human freedom. Solidarity, on
the one hand, promotes personal responsibility for discharging common duties
and fulfilling social needs; subsidiarity, on the other hand, promotes universal
assistance and cooperation with respect for human dignity, international
reciprocity, and standards of global coordination. Solidarity and subsidiarity are
two sides of the same coin. Without subsidiarity, solidarity becomes
imperialistic; without solidarity, subsidiarity becomes ineffective.
The degree of complementarity between the incomplete global human
community and each complete political community is not perfect or mutual, like
a left and a right shoe, which must be worn together. The two shoes are solidary
but not subsidiary. Nor is it like the relation between complementary goods and
base goods, as between airlines and airports. There is a more profound
relationship that integrates human beings and the earth, providing the necessary
environment in which the human person can thrive with dignity. This degree of
political
through
determined
must ultimately be
complementarity
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decisionmaking according to global law and the principles of solidarity and
subsidiarity.
IV. CONCLUSION
A new global human community is emerging, different from the current
international community, made up of all human beings and based on the dignity
of each person rather than the sovereignty of each nation-state. The implications
of moving the primary subject of international law from the nation-state to the
human person are so profound that they will change the very legal foundations
of public law.
I have put forward four arguments for the existence of this global human
community. Each in and of itself could justify the existence of this new
community. They focus on the same reality from different perspectives. The
argument from dignitas refers to the strong and inherent connection between
humanity as a whole and the law as a specific human tool to order it. The usus
argument is based on the relation between humanity as such and the planet earth
as the home of our species. The necessitas argument is grounded in the concept of
necessity as a source of binding law. Lastly, the bonum commune argument has
been used to defend the common good as a constituent element of the global
human community.
This new global human community is a political community of persons, not
of nation-states; is universal in nature; consists of compulsory membership; and
is incomplete and complementary. These key features of the new global human
community ultimately determine both the structure of its legal system and its
legal authority. I define the global human community as a political community in
the sense of a system of global governance and social cooperation made up of
institutions and administered by a legal authority under the rule of law. The
global human community is universal because it includes each and every human
being without exception. But universality is not totality. Indeed, in the realm of
the global law paradigm, for the sake of freedom and pluralism, total legal
structures like the nation-state cannot be universalized. A necessary consequence
of universality is that the global human community is a non-voluntary
community. Additionally, it is incomplete and complementary because, although
it embraces all humanity, its end would not be the ultimate fulfillment of all
human needs but only those global needs that affect humanity as a whole.
Addressing the needs of globalization does not require the establishment of
a universal complete community (communitasperfectissima).To do so would lead to
a totalitarian global community and a monstrous world empire (imperium totius
orbis). What is required, in my opinion, is a more modest but efficient global
human community of the sort described above, as an appropriate way to manage
globalization and resolve the problems of humanity as a whole.
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